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IVORY TOWER MEETS JAMES BOND
David C. Foley
George, Roger, and James Bruce, eds. Analyzing Intelligence:
Origins, Obstacles, and Innovations. Washington, D.C.:
Georgetown Univ. Press, 2008. 230pp. $29.95
As I look at the intelligence community, it should not “support”
or “oppose” an administration. It should be professional, factual
and give the best possible analysis, regardless of where the chips
may fall.
SENATOR DIANNE FEINSTEIN
Senator Feinstein’s comment, found on a November 2004 memo written by
then–CIA director Porter Goss regarding potential politicization of intelligence
analysis, could serve as the preamble to this book. The editors, Roger George and
James Bruce, themselves respected career intelligence analysts, have assembled a
compendium of essays by leading lights of the U.S. intelligence community, es-
says that examine the history, efficacy, pitfalls, and achievements of U.S. intelli-
gence analysis roughly from World War II to the present. They also make a
number of recommendations for improving analysis, thereby reducing the like-
lihood of “intelligence failures” that have so frequently been in the media spot-
light over the past several years.
Curiously enough, in their introduction George and Bruce cast this book as
one of a precious few that examine intelligence as a profession, and indeed they
pose the direct question: “Is there a professional discipline known as intelligence
analysis?” As a career intelligence officer myself, my initial reaction to this ques-
tion was that it is unworthy of serious discussion, as intelligence craft in the
United States has been institutionalized (most nota-
bly) within the CIA since 1944, or as far back as the
creation of a distinct Office of Naval Intelligence in
1882. Yet upon further reflection, I can attest that this
is a fair question, and this book takes a crack at an-
swering it.
Over the course of my career, I have frequently en-
countered the debate of science versus art regarding
the field of intelligence. Few doubt the science behind
the technologies committed to intelligence collection
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and to exploitation of the data. From satellites to cross-referenced computer da-
tabases to unmanned vehicles, the U.S. intelligence community has been at the
cutting edge of technology and has pushed the limits of the ability of science to
collect and turn myriads of data points into value-added knowledge for decision
makers. Yet it is on the analytic side, which is what George and Bruce largely ad-
dress, that art enters. Even the most accurate raw data must ultimately be synthe-
sized and interpreted by human minds, and thus varying conclusions, let alone
predictions, are inevitably drawn. Even with today’s advanced computing
power, life factors of the analyst and the analyzed are many and unpredictable,
and they do not lend themselves well to straight-line logic or laboratory replica-
tion. So a consideration of the degree of professionalization of intelligence anal-
ysis is welcome.
While the editors declare that the major thrust of this work centers on intelli-
gence analysis as a professional discipline, only a single chapter actually ad-
dresses it. The book examines the fields of law, medicine, and library science as
exemplars of a defined “profession.” In short order, chapter 3 concludes that “to
the extent that intelligence analysis has remained idiosyncratic and lacks over-
sight mechanisms by which all its practitioners systematically acquire, share,
and produce knowledge, it is not yet recognizable as a full-fledged discipline.”
This, of course, is debatable. There are many factors that argue otherwise, not
the least of which is the large number of individuals who have dedicated the
better parts of their lives to producing intelligence. Others include a common
lexicon that exists across the intelligence community and a similarity of ap-
proach toward assessment making among most intelligence organizations. Yet
this provocative conclusion gets the reader’s attention, and it serves George and
Bruce well as a point of departure for the rest of the volume. Organized into six
sections of three chapters each plus a conclusion, Analyzing Intelligence ends up
being much more than an excursion into the issue of intelligence analysis as a
professional discipline. In fact, it covers a broad array of intelligence issues, in-
cluding a short history of U.S. intelligence, the matter of professionalization of
the discipline, and a number of lessons learned, methodologies, and manage-
ment approaches that can serve to improve the quality of intelligence analysis.
Taken as a whole, George and Bruce have succeeded in providing a book that is
more primer than an effort to answer the question of professionalization of the
discipline. (Indeed, it has recently come to my attention that the volume is re-
quired reading for new analysts at the Office of Naval Intelligence.)
The first two chapters briefly outline the history of U.S. intelligence for the
uninitiated, and those from chapter 4 on effectively review the bidding of some
of the key pitfalls of intelligence analysis, as well a number of recommendations
toward improving the objectivity, quality, and predictive nature of the analysis
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produced by the intelligence community as a whole. From the perspective of a
career intelligence officer, I found most intriguing the chapters “Policy-Analyst
Relationship” and “Enduring Challenges.” These pieces are written from the
benefit of hindsight by some of the most senior and experienced intelligence of-
ficers and analysts in the community. To name a couple, there are John
McLaughlin, former deputy director for intelligence at CIA, and James
Steinberg, former deputy national security adviser to the Clinton administra-
tion. They lay out several keen insights, such as the inherent dichotomies be-
tween the analytic and policy-making communities. For example, McLaughlin
makes the point that the policy world is by necessity a culture of optimism,
where obstacles, including contrary intelligence assessments, are meant to be
overcome. Intelligence analysts, on the other hand, are focused on threats and
dangers, leading to a darker culture, more marked by skepticism. Steinberg
points out that this natural friction between policy makers and intelligence ana-
lysts is exacerbated by unrealistic expectations and lack of appreciation. Policy
makers and other intelligence consumers crave clarity and certainty, whether in
execution of political initiatives or military operations, and often do not under-
stand the limitations of intelligence. Analysts, for their part, often do not appre-
ciate the many factors, of which intelligence is but one, that weigh upon policy
makers.
McLaughlin and Steinberg offer several strategies to overcome these frictions,
such as embedding intelligence analysts into policy-making circles, informing
leaders of intelligence limitations, and producing and presenting intelligence as-
sessments as tools that help policy makers think through the problems, rather
than as data dumps. McLaughlin makes a particularly salient point where he as-
serts that surprise (the thing most irksome to leaders) “is almost never the result
of an easy-to-predict shift. It almost always creeps up on you.” Clearly, one of the
greatest services analysts can perform is keeping leaders a step or two ahead of
major changes.
Several contributing authors use the failure of the intelligence community
to warn of the events of 9/11 and the inaccurate assessments of Iraq’s weapons
of mass destruction (WMD) prior to the 2003 U.S.-led invasion as central les-
sons for improved analysis in the future. One chapter focuses on the impera-
tive for the analyst to avoid politicization yet remain relevant to the issue at
hand. Another chapter reviews the analytical dangers of foreign denial and de-
ception, which was clearly evident and effective in the case of the nonexistent
Iraqi WMD programs and stocks. A point is made that though denial and de-
ception is more about the limitations of intelligence collection than analysis,
the savvy analyst must remain cognizant of these limitations throughout the
analytical process—easier said than done. Surprisingly (in that I am a career
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intelligence professional), by the end of the book I was better informed regard-
ing what went wrong with intelligence support surrounding 9/11 and the Iraq
War, a benefit of taking the time to read this book.
I would be remiss not to comment on chapter 9, which concerns challenges to
U.S. military analysis. David Thomas, a senior analyst at the Defense Intelligence
Agency, points to several “perennial” problems, such as the ponderous, bureau-
cratic behavior of military organizations, which in his view impedes creativity
and dissemination. He also points to “new” problems, such as the increased
speed of modern military operations, the diminished analytical capabilities of
defense intelligence agencies due to numerous reorganizations, excessive focus
on current intelligence, and (perhaps as a result) the attrition of experienced an-
alysts, both in uniform and out. I can attest to some of these points, especially
the one about the detrimental impact of reorganizations. I experienced this dur-
ing tours with the Joint Staff, Navy Staff, and the Office of Naval Intelligence.
Some of these initiatives had positive outcomes, but they were clearly taxing to
the organizations, especially to the long-term civilian workforce.
Wrapping up their book, George and Bruce are cautiously optimistic that the
intelligence lessons of the past several years, combined with a better apprecia-
tion of collection limitations and some new approaches to analysis (e.g.,
computer-aided analysis of competing hypotheses and others), will lead to more
objective and reliable intelligence assessments. Yet they also admit that “fixing
analysis seems a perennial and elusive goal,” even given the several reasonable
fixes proposed in this book. One of these recommendations involves greater ed-
ucational opportunities for analysts, to include job rotation for analysts into
American academia, and likewise for academics to take up temporary residence
within intelligence community organizations. This should resonate with, at a
minimum, the military service colleges and the National Defense University,
convenient places for the integration of academia and intelligence analysis. Call
it Ivory Tower meets James Bond. Call it what you will, but it is an idea whose
time has come, and Analyzing Intelligence, although not fully convincing about
the lack of a “professional” discipline of intelligence analysis, is worth the read
for those concerned with effectively “connecting the dots” ahead of the next cri-
sis on the horizon.
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